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Abstract. An algorithm is presented for computing an equilibrium of an ex-
tensive Lwo-person game with perfect recall. The equilibrium is traced on a
piecewise linear path from an arbitrary starting point. If this is a pair of com-
pletely mixed strategies, then thc equilibrium is normal form pcrfect. '1'he nor-
mal form cornputation is performed efficiently using the sequence form, which
has the same size as the extensive game itself.
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1. Introduction
Consider a Lwo-person garne in extensive form where the players have perfect recall.
This paper presents an cfficient algorithm for finding an eyuilibrium of such a game
with appealing properties. Civen the game, it cornputes a sample equilibrium that is
normal jorm perject. Thc algorithm generates a piecewise linear path in the strategy
space. An arbitrary strategy pair is chosen as starting point, serving as a parameter
for the computation. Various starting points can be tried to find possibly differcnt
equilibria. The probabiliticw for playing strategies at the starting point become
relative mistnkc probahilities for playing suboptimal strategies iu mixed strategies
that approxirnate the cornputed equilibrium. 'Chus, t.his equilibriurn is perfect if the
start.ing poinl, is completcly mixed.
'I'hc algorithrn is higwy efíicicut bc,causc it uscw a data structurc that docs
not take more spac:e than the extensive game itself. 'Ihis is thc sequence jorm of
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1the extensivc game (von Stengel 1996). In the sequence form, mixed strategies
o[ a player are identified in a natural way when they are realization equivalent,
that is, induce the same behavior in the game tree and therefore the same payoffs.
After this identification, they belong to a strategy space (a certain polytope) of low
dimension, which is equal to Lhc total numbcr of ~uoves uí the player. lu contrast,
Lhe mixed strategy simplex has typically exponential dimension in the size of the
game tree. 'I'his exponential blowup makes standard methods applied to the normal
form impractical.
The computation can be interpreted garne-theoretically. In this interpretation,
the starting point represents a prior against which the players react initially. Next,
Lhey gradually adjust their behavior by using inforrrration about the strategy that
is actually playcd. Each point on the piecewise linear path is an equilibrium of a
restricted gamc where the prior is played with some probability being initially one
and then being decreased towards zero (wiLh possible intermittent increases). This
mimicks L}re lincar tracirrg procedure av formulated by Harsanyi and Selten (]988),
who use iL to dete.rmine an equilibrium for a batiic gamc st.arting from the given prior.
Hasic games result from the so-called standard forrn of an extensive game after a
reduction procedure. Here we emulate, up to projection, the tracing procedure for
Lhe normal forrn, which can be considered as a special case of the standard form for
this purpose.
The sc:quence form straLegy space of a player is a linear projection of his mixed
strategy sirnplex. 'fhe relevant properties of mixed strategies for the above inter-
pretation are preserved, like lying on a line or being cornpletely mixed. In a sense,
we merely períorm normal form computations efficiently. 1'herefore, the emulated
Lracing procedure and the perfection o[ the eyuilibrium apply to the normal form of
Lhc game.
Our algorithm is a synthesis of previous, partly independent work by the au-
Lhors and Daphne Koller and Nimrod Megiddo. For bimatrix games, van cíen Elzen
and Talman (1991) (se.r. also van dcn h,Izen 1993) described a complementary pivot-
ing algorithm that traces a given prior to an equilibrium. If the prior is completely
mixed, the computed path leads to a perfect equilibrium. Generically, the algorithm
represents Lhe linear tracing procedure by Tlarsanyi and Selten up to projection (van
den Elzen and'1'alman 1995). Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996) applied the
complementary pivoting algorithm by Lemke (1965) Lo the sequence form. As a
special case, it can also be applied t.o a game in norrnal form. If one chooses in a
specific way a certain parameter in Lemke's algorithm, Lhe so-called covering vector,
t.hen one obtains the algoriLhm by van den Elzen and Talman.
Here, we derive the covering vector for Lemke's algorithm analogously from an
arbitrary sLarLing point, but applied Lo Lhe sequence forrn. As a conseyuence of this
initialization, the generated path stays in Lhe compact strategy space. This simplifies
the earlier proof of Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996) that the algorithm
`Ltenninates, which was very technical. Ilowever, degeneracy has to be dealt with
properly (using a known lexicographic pivoting rule) since it arises naturally from
the garne tree structure. IL can easily happen that along the generated path of
strategies, it becornes no longer optirnal to puL weighL on au eutire branch of thc
garne trtr.. At. Lhat rnoment rnore than one variable becornes zero and degeneracy
occurs. 'I'hus, degeneracy in extensive form garnes is related to the structure of the
game tree. For generic bimatrix games, degeneracy could be disregarded.
Wilson (197`l) described a method for solving extensive two-person games,
where best responses, which serve as pivoting columns for the Lemke-Howson algo-
rithm, are generated directly frorn the game tree. This algorithm is based ou the
norrnal forrn and efficient only in the sense that it uses few pure strategies with
positive probability, a clairn made morc precise by Koller and Megiddo (1996). Cx-
cept for very small ganre Lrees, the sequence torm has smaller size than any normal
form representation, among other things because of its sparse payoff matrix. Wilson
(1992) adapted the Lemke-Howson algorithm for computing a"simply stable" cyui-
librium of a bimatrix gama. 'I'he computed eyuilibrium ís also perfcct (McKelvey
and McLennan, 1996, Lemma ~i). '1'he algorithrn uses a lexicographic perturbatiou
techniyue irnplyirrg that thc rnistakc probabilities for pure strategies in approximat-
ing mixed strategies have cíifferent orders of magnitude, according to an initially
chosen order of the pure strategies. In contrast, we can "fine-tunen mistake prob-
abilities with the choice of the starting point. IL is open if Wilson's algorithm for
finding sirnply stíLblC eyuilibria can bc usefully applicd to the sequence form.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In Section 'l we recall the notion of the
seyueuce form and its derivation from the extensive Corm game, wit,h particular
emphasis on the geometry of the strategy spaces. In Section 3 we consider optimal
play in the seyuence form. Section 4 is devoted to Lemke's algorithm, adapted for
Lhe particular covering vector. The path cornputed by the algorithm is illustrated
in Section 5. We claborate on the game-theorotic interpretation in Section 6. In the
Appendix, we discuss t,he treatment of degeneracy.
2. Sequence form strategy spaces
We consider extensive t,wo-person games, with conventions similar to von Stengel
(1996) and Kollcr, Megiddo, and von Stengcl (199fi). An extensive game is givc~n
by a finite trce, payo(fs at thc Icaves, chance moves (with positive probabilities),
and ínformat.iou sets partitioning the set of decision uodes. 'I'he choices of a player
arE~ denoted by labels of trcr edges. h'or simplicity, labels corresponding to different
choices (anywhere in I,he Lree) are distinct,. I~or a particular player, any node of
the tree dc(ines a seyucrECr, of choices given by the respective labels (for his or her
moves only) on Lhe path from the root to the node. We assumc that both playcrs
have perfect recull. By definition, this mcans that all nodes in an infonnation set h
;iof a player define for hirn (or her) the same seyuence on of choices. Under that
assurnption, each choice c at h is Lhe last choice of a unique sequence ahe. This
defines all possible sequences of a player excepL for the cmpty sequence 0. The set
of choices at an information set h is denot,ed Ch. 'Ihe set. of information sets of
player i is ll;, and the set of his seyucnces is .4;, so
S;-{0} U {vhc~hEff;,cECh}.
This implies that the number of sequences of player i, apart from the empty se-
yucnce, is equal to his total number oí moves, that is, ~S;~ - 1~- ~hEy, ~Ch~. This
nurnber is linear in the size of the game tree.
A behavior strategy Q of player i is given by probabilities ,l?(c) for his choices
c which fulfill Q(c,) ~ 0 and ~„E~n ~i(c) - 1 for all h in ft;. This definition of ~3 can
be extended Lo Lhe sequences o in .S; by writing
,d[a] - ~ Q(c)- (2.1)
~~no
A purr, strategy a is a behavior strategy with rr(c) E{0, I} for all choices c. The
set of pure strategies of player i is denoted P,. Thus, n[rr] E {0,1 } for all sequences
rr in .5;. '1'he pure strategies rr with rr[a] - 1 are those "agreeing" with a by
prescribing all Lhe choices in a(and arbitrary choices at the information sets not
touched by v).
In the normal jorm of the extensive game, one considers pure strategies and
their probability mixtures. A mi2ed strategy ~ of player i assigns a probability
tr(rr) to cvery rr in I;. In the sequence jorrn of the extensive game, one considers
the sequences of a player instead of his pure st,rategies. A randomized strategy of
player i is described by the realization probabilities of playing the sequences rr in S;.
For a bchavior strategy ~i, t.hese are obviously ,!j[rr] as in (2.1). For a mixed strategy
~ of player i, I,hey are given by
lr[~] - ~ ~[~]Ir(~)- (2.2)
nE1:
h'or player I, Lhis defines a map x frorn Si to Ilt by x(r1) - li[o] for Q in S~ which
wc, call the rcaliznlian plara o( ti or a rcalization plan for player l. A realization
pla.n for playcr'l, siniila.rly dcfined on S1, is dc~noted y. RcalizaLiou plans have the
following important propertics (Koller and Megiddo 1992, von Stengel 1996).
Lemma 2.1. hbr playcr 1, x is the rcalization plan of a mixcd strategy iff x(a) ? 0
for all a E .5i and
z(~) - 1,
~:z(ahc) - x(~h) for all h E llr.
~EOn
A re.alization plan y of player 'l is characterized analogously.
9Lemma 2.2. '1'wu mixr,rl.vtratc~~;icx te xnd li' uf playcr i are rcalization equivalcnt
il( thcy havc thc saruc rcalizatiuu plan, that is, i(f ~[a] - p'[a] Cor all a E.5';.
'fhc cyuations ('L.3) hold for thc rcalizaLion prubabilitics x(o) - ~i(o] for a
behavior sLrategy ~i and tlrus for every pure strategy rr, and therefore Eor their
convex cornbinations in (`l.2) with Lhe probabilities p(a).
P'or Lernma `l.`l, eyuation (`l.`L) should be regarcled Lhe other way, definiug a
lincar rnap from Q3~Y'~ Lo )Ft.~'s'~ Lhat maps (Ir(a))xEr., to (p[o])oES, with thc lixcd
coefficients n[a], ar E P,. Mixed st.rategies with the same irnage under Lhis map
define Lhc sarnc rcalization probabilitics for all nodes of the trc~e irrespective of t.hc"
strat.egy of Lhc oLher player, as staLed in Lernma 2.2. '1'he simpk~c of mixed stratcgics
is Lhcreby rnappccl Lo Lhc polytope dcfincd by Lhc lincar constrainLs in Lcrnrna `l.l.
'Phc verticc~ of Lhis polyLopc arc thc rcalizaLion plaus of pure stratcgics. "1'hcsc~
are uniyue exccpt, for idcntifying rcalization cyuivalont. pure sLrategics (as in Lhc
reduced norma! Jorm for generic payoffs, here 13NF fur short). 'I'hese vertices may
be exponential in nurnber like in the mixed strategy simplex, but the dirnension of
the polytope is rnuch smaller since it is linear in the size of the game tree. Por
player i, this dimensiou is the number ~5;~ of variables minus the number 1 f ~Il;~ of
eyuations ('2.3) (which arc linearly indepenclenL), so it, is ~hEll,(~Ch~ - 1). 13ecause
of Lhis reductiou in dirnension, niixed strategies are "projectedn to realizaLion plans,
buL wiLhouL losing any rclcvant sLrategic information in Lhe extensive game.
In Lhe seyuence Corm, Lhe slralegy space of each player is Lhe polyLope of his
realization plans. A line in this strategy space is the irnage of a line in the mixed
strategy simplex, which is usually not unique, however. Any rcalizaLion plan x of
player 1(and similarly g for playcr 'L) naturally defines a behavior strategy ~i where
Lhc probability for making Lhc movc c is (i(c) - x(ohc)~x(ar,) (which is arbitrary
for cxamplc, ~i(c) - I~~Cr,~ if x(ah) - 0, LhaL is, Llrc iufonnaLion seL h is
irrclevant). llowever, this is obviously not a lincar "invcrse map" if fi is regarded as
a special mixed strategy.
higure 'l.l shows an extensive garne where the choices of player 1 and player 2
arc denoted by Lhe uppc~r and lowcr case Ict.t.ars 1,, R, .5','I' and n, G, c, d, respectivcly.
'Che payoft vectors are listed aL the bottorn with Lhe first and second componc~nt
representing Lhe payoff t.o player 1 and 2, respect.ivcly. '[he sets of sequences are Sr -
{d, L, li, Il~S,l~"I'} aud ,S'z -{~l,n,G,c,d}. We consider realization plans as vectors
x-(x„)„E.ti, and ,y -(,y~)„E,S„ hcre both wiLh five cornponents; the sequences are
written as subscripts unless they are complicated expressions like in (2.3). According
to Lemma'l.l, these vectors are characterized by
x~o, lsx-c and ,y?o, ('y-I (z.4)
(the inequalities hold componentwise, and 0 denotes a vector or matrix of zeroes),
with
~~~la ~ ~o~ ~o~ ~ ~~ ~n~ ~ o ~ ~o~ ~ío~
Figure 2.1. A two-person extensive gamc.
E- I-1 1-1
1 1) F- (-1 1 1 1 l l, c-1- l oJ
.
F:ach sequence appears exactly once on the Ieft hand side of the equations ('l.3),
accounting Cur the entry i in each column of Ls and !'. fíere, the polytope of
realizaLion plans has dimension t.wo for cach player.
For playcr l, iL is useful to consider onl,y the nonnegative variables xr,, xati,
xit-r which sum up to one since r0 - 1 and s~a - sxs f xtrr. ~I'his defines a triangle
as st.rategy space. 'Phe seyuences 1,, l{.S, H'f are here iu one-to-one correspondence
wiLh Lhe pure strategics ( L, ~), (R,S), ( l~,'L') in thc RNF (in an obvious notation),
so Lhc simplex of rnixed sLraLegies is also Lwo-dimensional.
When docs t.he I1N1~ Icad to ,trategy spaceti of higher ditnension than thc
sayuence forrn? 'I'his is the case, when a player has parallrl inforrnation sets h and
h', t.hat is, or, -~h~. '1'hen, all cornbinations of rnoves at h and h' are part of
scparaLc stratcgics in the RNF. If Lhere arc nu parallel inforniat.ion set.s, t.herc is a
one-to-one correspoudence between rnaxirnal se~yue,ne es cr and KNF strategies, sinca,
no rnoves other Lhan those in a are relevanL when playing o. In that case (like for
player I in thc cxarnplc), a playcr's mixcd st ratcgy virnplex iu the RNF has the same
low dimension ati his st,rat.egy space in the ~c~quc~nce form.
fil~or player'l, there are two pairs y„yb and ,y~,yd of strategic variables subjcct
I,o y~ 0 and ya -F yb - I ancl ,y~ f y,i - I.'1'his strategy spacc is a squarc rathcr I,lian
a triangle. Its vertices correspond to the four pure sl.rategies of player 'l (sc~c also
figurc 3.4 below). In tho I}.NI~, thcsc correspond to thc pure strategies (a, c), (n, d),
(b,c), (b,d). 'I'hus, the rnixed strategy simplcx of playcr'l is a tetrahedron, one di-
mension higher than the seyuence (orm strategy space, because the two information
sets of player 2 are parallcl.
3. Optimal play
Seyuence forrn payo(ís are defined for pairs o[ sequences whenever these lead to a
leaf, rnultipliecl by the probabilities of chance rnoves on the path to the leaf. 1'his
clcfincs I,wo sparsc matriccs A ancl !1 of dimcnsion ~Si~ x ~Sl~ for player I and
player 2, respectivcly. Then, thc expected payo(fs under the realization plans x and
y are xT~ly and rTBy, representing the surn over all leaves of the payoffs at leaves
rnultiplied by t.heir realization probabilities.
We can characterize optirnal play of a player by a pair of dual linear programs
(I,I's), a~c [ullows. If y iti fixcd, an optirnal rcalization plan x of player 1 maxirnizes
his expectec] payoff xT ( ny), subject to x 7 0, Ex - e. This LP has a dual LP with
a vector u of unconstrained variables whose dimension is 1 t ~Hr~, the number of
rows oí !'. '1'his dual LP is to minimize eTU subject to
GT u ? Ay. (3.1)
For the extensive garne in I~igure'L.l, these constrainf.s are indicated in higure 3.1,
wherc the rows and columns of I;T and A are matked with the components of x
ancl u and y, respectivcly. 'fhe sparse payoff matrix A has blank (zero) entrics for
thc pairs of scqucnccs not Icading to a Ieaf. Sornc zero cntrics arc cntered explicit,ly
siuce they xrise from payoffs that are zero. '1'he payoff 24 at one of the leaves is
entered as 1'2 in the matrix A since it is multiplied by the chance probability '~2 for
rcaching Lhc Icaf.
Yrimal and dual },P liave the same optimal value of the objective (unc:tion.
'Phat is, x is a best response to ,y iff there is a dual solution u with xT(Ay) - eTU.
Since eT - xT ET , this is cyuivalent to
xT(t'.TU - l}y) - ~. (a.2)
1'his is the complementary slackness of a pair of dual linear programs (sec, for
cxamplc, Schrijver 198fi).
Sirnilarly, y is a best response Lo x iff , y ? 0, !'y - j, and there is an uncon-
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}~igure 3.L Constraints (3.1) of best response LP (or player 1 with dual vector u.
and
yT(~,,T,U - {3T2) - ~. (.3.~)
I~'igure~ 3.2 shows ( 3.3) in its t,ransposed fonn T~TI~' ?:r.TB for our example, so that
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1~'igure 3.2. Constraints (3.3) of best response LP Cor player 2 with dual vector v.
'fhe dual const,raints (3.1) and (3.3) havc~ the advantage~ that they st.ay lincar
even if t.he realization plan of Lhe othcr player is trc~ated as a variable, because the
variablcs related to diffc~rent. playcrs appear in different terms. 'I~hese linear con-
straints and ('l.9), together with the orthogonality conditions (3.2) and (3.4), define
a tinrar complementnrity problr.m (LCP) whose solutions (u,v,.r, y) characterize the
equilibria (x,,y) of the game. ~
In our examplc, we can illustrate the solutions to this LCP by drawing the
atral~~fiy spaccs of Lhc t,wo playc~rs. 1'igure 3.3 shows the strategy space of player 1
cousistiug oC Lhe possible values of his sLrategic variables Ti„ .T~~s, .TRT. Figure :3.4
~xHS - ~ O x~ xRT - ~
higure 3.3. SLrategy space of player 1 with best response seyuences of player 2 for
the seyuence forrn of Lhe game in 1~'igure 'l.l. The circled numbers are
labels for identifying ca~rily the equilibria (xt , yt ), (x~, y2), (x3, y')
shuws Lhis for player 2 with the pairs ya,y~, and y~,,y,t represented by the vertical
and horizontal coordinates of a syuare. Note that ya - 0 iff yb - 1 and vice versa.
The same holds for y~ and yd. The redundant variables xa, xH and ya are not shown
since their value is known, and they also have no payolf cntry in Figure 3.1 and 3.2.
Figure a.l shows that the rows in (3.1) corresponding to the variables x~, xHS,
xH'r have thc form
ut ~ I ly, i- 3yb
uz ~ 12yd (3.5)
ul ~ 6y~ .
'Che Lwo other rows read u~ - ui ~ 0 and ui - uz ~ 0. Since x.a - 1 ~ 0, t.he
corresponding incyuality is always binding, that is, uo - ut - 0, by the slackness
conditions (:1.'2). Similarly, u~ - uz - 0 whcnever xtt ~ 0, that is, when xH5 or
q?~r - I „3 O tId - 1












higure 3.4. Strategy space of player 2 with best response sequences of player 1.
xa-r is posil,ivc. Since xr„ ~rts, zkr arc not all rero, one iuequality in (3.5) is
binding and ui ís the maximum of Lhc right hand sides in (3.5). Furthermore,
ouly for binding ineyualities (where the maximum ís achieved), which correspond
f,o certain sequences Q of player 1, thc component x~ of :r can be positive. In other
words, only scqucnccs o I,hat are "best responses" for playcr 1 can have positive
realization probability x,,. For player l, this is easy to interpret since o corresponds
to a pure strategy in Lhe RNF. Figure 3.4 shows the regions where the sequences
I. (region 10), RS (region ~2 ), or kF (region 30), are such best responses (the
purpose of the circled numbers wíll be explained shortly). For example, (3.5) shows
that RS is preferred to RT iff 12yd ~ 6y~ - 6(1 - y,~), that is, yd ~ r~3.
l~or player 2, interpreting the slackness conditions (3.4) is easiest if sequences
are regarded as moves since player 2 does not pick a single seyuence but one of each
pair n, h and c, d (as expressed by thc equations Fy - J which are in this sense
qualitatively different from Ex - e). As Figure 3.2 illustrates, vo-vi -v2 - 0 since






so that vr and vl have Lo be Lhe maxirnum of thc respective right hand sides in (:3.fi).
Only when an inequality in (3.fi) is binding, the respective move in each pair a, b
and c,d cau be played with positive probability. (Thc. values of vr and vZ represenL
partial payoff5 aL Lhe inforrnaLion seLs of player 2 whcrc these moves take place, sc~c.
von Stcngcl 199fi.)
Figurc 3.:3 shows the st.ratcgy spacc of player l, subdivided iuLo different regions
whcrc thc seyucnces of playcr 'l arc optimal. '1'here are two pairs oC mgions, Lhc
rcgions ~ 4 and Q corresponding Lo thc movcs n and 6, and Lhc rcgions [~ s and
~7 corresponding to the moves c and d, where each point in Lhe straLegy space
belougs to aL Ieast one region of each pair. The line separating the regions 04 and
~5 describing where the rnove a or b is optirnal depends by (3.fi) only on the relative
size of x1, versus xlts and not on xr2~, so this liuc goes Lhrough the vertex xlrr - 1
of Llte Lriangle. '1'hia is duc to Lhe st.rucLurc of Lhe cxtensive garnc (1.hc, seyucnces
a, b, RI' occur in disjoint part.s of thc gamc Lrec) and is indepcudenL o[ Lhe payo(fs aL
the Ieaves. l~br bimatrix garnes, such a dr.~eneracy of Lhe sLrucLure of best response
regions can be excluded for gcncric garnes, hcre it is unavoidablc. Similarly, thc
regions Q and t~ whcrc c and d arc best responses are separated by a line through
thc vcrt.ex x1, - l.
Just as the four sl.rategics (u,c), (a,d), (b,c) and (b,d) of player 2 appear
as vertices of his strategy space in I~'igure 3.4, Lhey appear as intersections of best
responsc regious in Figure 3.3 whenever both movcs specificd in Lhe strategY are
opLimal. The straLegy space of player 1 is thus divided inLo four such intersections,
which would appear irr t.he same way as best responsc regions when Lhe st.rategies of
player `l were considered direct,ly (so the degencracies remain). The sequence form,
however, gives hcre a rnore explanatory pict.urc than t.hc norrnal Corm of the gamc.
We can enumeratc all equilibria of this game using a labeling t.echnique sirnilar
to Shapley ( 1971). rach of Lhe sequenc,es l,, I~S, R'I', a, h, c, d corresponds to a label
01 ,...,~7 indicaLed by a circled number in l~igure 3.3 and '3.9. 'I'here, these labels
mark the (closccl) regions iuside t,hc strategy spaces when they are best responses of
thc other player. Out,side Lhe strategy spaccs, these labels mark thc regions next, Lo
the facets of the own st,raLegy space where the respective sequence has probability
zcro.
A strategy pair (x,,y) in Lhc Lwo strategy spaces is labeled with all the labcls
of the regions that x and ,y belong to. I~'or example, the pair of vertices xH5 - I
and yb - 1, y~ - 1 has the labels ~l , Q3 , ~5 , 6Q, and t~ 3 , Q 4 , Q7 . By comple-
mentary slackness, ( x, y) is an eqreilibrium iff it has all seven labels since then every
llseyuence is cither a best response or playcd wil.h probabilit.y zero. I~or the men-
t.ioncd pair o( vcrtices, this is not thc case since thc labcl (~ 2 (representing l~.S) is
rnissing. Onc cyuilibrium, denoted (x~,T~~), is in t.he interior of the two strategy
Spa('E;ti, lxL~xK.SixJiT) - 15,I4i~~,14,3,~) and (ynr?~óiy~fiyd) -( t,d~~,S~z,:i~r,3). f~nother
cquilibrium, dcnotcd (z~,,y1), is (x~,aKS,TÍt'1') - (~,r~a,~~a) and (y~,yeiy~,yd) -
(0, I,'~~:r, ~~;r). 'I'hesc cyuilibria are non dcgcncratc in the scnse that no label occurs
more than once. hinally, the vertex xi, - I in higure 3.3 carries five labels t~ 2 , ~3 ,
~4 , ~6 , ~7 , while t.he two missing labels ~l and ~ 5 rnark two regions in Figure 3.4
which have a common boundary. All points on this boundary yield equilibria, indi-
cated by the pair of rectangular boxes. These eyuilibria are given by x~ - 1, ya - 1,
and 0 C yd G tr~12. It is easy to check that there are no further equilibria.
Shapley (1974) e.xplained the I,emke Howson algorithm for bimatrix games
with this labeling technique. Thereby, the edges separating the regions in Figure 3.3
and `3.4 define a graph. The outside regions are separated by edges which are
connected to outer vertices x - 0 and y - 0 in an extra dimension. Starting
frorn the ficticious equilibrium point (2, y) -(o, 0) which has all labels, the Lemke-
FIowson method follows a path in the (product) graph by dropping and picking up
a label at a tirne until an equilibrium is reached. Such a method could be applied to
our example, but with a more sophisticated change of labels since the graphs have
non-uniform degree, partly due to degeneracies. Defining this method generally
for the seyuence form is a Lopic of future research. Instead, we will now describe a
rnethod of generating a path from an arbitrary starting point in each strategy space.
4. Complementary pivoting
'1'hc cyuilibriuni conditions derived from the scyuence form define a linear comple-
rncntarity problem (LCP). 'I'he standard fonn of an LCP is characterized by an




1'he condition zTw - 0 says that the nonnegative vectors z -(zr,...,z„)T anrl
w- (vu~, ... , w„)T are complernentnry, that is, at least one variable oí each pair
z;, w, for I G i G n is zero, whereas the other rnay be nonzero. A mixed LCP (sec
CoLIJe, Pang, and SLone 1992, p. 29) has more general constraints than z, w~ 0
in (4.1): sorne variables z; rnay be unrestricted in sign where the corresponding
variable w; is always zero. 'I'he LCP derived from the sequence form with constraints
('l.4 ) ancí (3. l)(3.~) is such a mixed LCP. It has variables z- (u, v, x, y)T and
w-(w,,, 7L,~, rUr, wy)T. The sign restrictions are none for u and v, whereas x~ 0,
1 'L,y 1 0, w„ - 0, w„ - 0, w~ 1 0, wy ~ 0. "I'hc rcquirement zTw - 0 is then
cquivalent Lo
2T7llr - O, T~TTOy - O. (~}.Z~






It is casy, but contputat.ionally uot nec:essary, to convert this mixed LCP to t,hc~
standard fonn (4.1) by rcpresenting Ta and v as di(fcrences of nonnegativc vectors
and replacing c~ach equation in l~;r - c and l~?I - J by a pair of inequalities.
Le~mke (196Fi) deseribed au algorithm for solving t.he LCY (4.l). }t uscs an
additional n vector d, c.a.lled coveriny veclor, and a correspondiug scalar variahle z~,,
and computc~s wil,h solut.ions to thc augmcuted aystcm
z , z~ ? 0
w-q-}-Mzfdzcl0 (~.~3)
zTw-O.
I`n almost f01fL111(71tCRtlLT`I) G4.42.ti is a scL of n Gasic variables that. contains at mosL
onu variahlc, uf ca,ch cotnplctncnl.ary pair z„Ta; for I G i. C n and possibly zc, such
tha.t these variahles define a uniquc solul,ion to w- q f Mz } dzc if all other
(nonGasic) variables are zero. Suppose 1,his solution fulfills (4.3), that is, z~ 0,
zo 1 0, and To ~ 0. 1[ zc is nonbasic, this solvos (4.1). 01,herwise, there is a pair
z;, w; of noubasic variablcs. Alluwiug ouc uf them, designated as cntr.ring vnriaLlr,
to be nonncgative besidcs Lhe basic variables, t,he solutions of (4.3) to thcse n} I
variables usua.lly dchnC a IInC sl`gmc`Ilt tllat {OIIIti Lhe current almost complctnc~ntary
b,utiis to anothcr onc. `I'hat ncw a.lmost cotnplrntcnt.ary ha,tiis contains Ihc c,ntcrin?;
variablc, and sontc fortncrly b.utiic variablc thal. has bc,cotnc zcru has.ti lcjl Lhc hasi,.
If t,liis is noL z~t, its cornplement is the next cntcring variable. '1'hc resulting itcrativr`
change of bases is callc~d complemenlarJ pivoling. After a suitable initialization,
this generatc~ti a sequence of bases t.ha.t, define a piecewise linear path which, unde~r
ccrt.ain condit~ions, encís in a solution to thc LCP (A.l). Kollc:r, Mcgiddo, and von
5tengel (199(i) give a rnorc detailed exposit,ion of Lentke's algorithrn aud show that
it tcrtninates for the L('P dcrived frorn the sequence form.
lror thc~ spccific pruhlc~tn at, hand, wc choosc a part,icular covcring vector rl that
is rc~lated to thc starting posil.ion for our cornputation. Let (v,t) be an arbitrary
stnrting vector, t.hat is, a pair of rcaliration plans for t.he two playcrs, so that










H~y -~ Izp - j (4.6)
ws - Eru - Ay - (At)zp ~ 0
wy- Í'TTJ-f~T2 -(i~TS)Zpi~.
An inil,ial solnt.ion to (4.fi), which fulfills also (4.`l), is giveu by zp - l, ~- 0, y- 0,
and suit.ablc vectors u and v so that GT7L 1 At and !'TV ~ 13TS, that is, w~ ~ 0
and nr„ ? 0. Wc also havc to find an alrnosL complernentary basis representing this
initial tiolul.ion. 'I'hcrc, thc problcrn is that. sornc components of x and y have to be
taken as basic variablcs, although with value zero, since otherwise the linear system
(4.(i) restricted to the basic variables does not have full rank n. We will address this
yucstiou shortly.
'I'he couditions (4.6) and (4.`L) are the equivalent of (4.3) and hold for all points
on thc piecewisc linear path computed by hemke's algorithm. The following ]emma
and the discussion thereafter shows that t,his path induces a path in the product
of the two strategy spaces which begins at the starting vector (s, t) and ends at an
equilibriurn.
Lemma 4.1. In any solution ( u, v, x, ,y, zp) to (4.6), x~ szp is a realization plan for
pl:r,ycr 1, y-}- lzp is a rcalization plan for playcr 2, and .xe - ye - I- zp ~ 0.
I'ronJ. 'fhe constraints (9.6) and (4.4) imply x -t- szp ~ 0, y-}- tzp ~ 0,
C(x -~ szp) - E~ f(Es)zp - Ex f ezp - e,
aud sirnilarly f~'(y f lzp) - j. By (2.3), the first of each of these equations says
:ce t zp - 1 and y0 ~- zp - 1, respectively. Q
13y Lcrnma 4.1, any solut.ion to (~.fi) fulfills 0 c zp c I. We can regard zp
as a probabilit,y assigned to the start.ing vector, initially zp - 1. 'I'he algorithm
tcrminates when zp - 0, so that x and y are realization plans and (x, y) is an
equilibrium by (4.2). At interrnittent steps of the computation with 0 G zp C 1, the
pair (x f szp, y f tzp) of realization plans can be seen as a mixture of a pair (i, y)
l4and the start.ing pair (.ti,t), chosc~u with pruhabilities I- zu and zu, respectivc.ly.
Namcly, let i-~. I~(1 - z~) and i~ -,y . I~(I - z~), au LhaL
r~ }.tivu - T~{- zo~ f s zo, y f lzo -!I ({- zu~ f t zcr. (~.7)
13y (~.(i), ls.c - c( I--u) and l~'il - j(1 - zrr), whirh irnplics l.ha1, :r aud y arc
rcalization plans.
'I'hc rcaliration plan :r -~ .tizu of playcr I{rlays any nequcucc a in S'r wit.lr al,
Ieast z~ t,irncs Lhc probability .ti„ it has undcr s, sincc x~ 0. Whenever xo 1 0,
the sequencc o has a largcr proba.bility than t.ha prohability .tiovrr. Similarly, Lhe
realization plan ~ f lzi, sclccl.s somc scyucnccs o in .S.z witlr probability t„~~ if
J„ - 0, the uthers with largcr probability y„ ~- l~z~. 'I'hc positive cornponenl,s :r„
and ,y„ of x and ~ arc t.hc satnc as Lhc positivc cornponents of i and i~ in (4.7), up
to scalar mull.iplication with 1-z~r. 13y Lhe following Iemma, tlresc are best response
seyuences to Lhe currenL pair of realizatiou plans.
Lemma 4.2. Cunsider a solul.ion (u,v,.x,,y,zu) to (9.6) aud (4.`l) with z~ G 1, and
let ~r -:c . I ~( l- zu ) ancl y- y~ I ~( I- zrr~. 'l'hcu (x, ,y) is a pair o( rcali~ation plairs
where i is a best reapuusc to y~ tzcr and y is a besl rr.tiponsc to x f.5zo.
I'rnnf. As nhown abovc, (~.fi) ini{rlios LhaL .é and y arc rcalizal,ion plans, a.nd
L;T,r ~ A(y f tz~).
13y (h2), sr(l;T'u - ~l(~l f tzo)) - :r.Tro,; - 0, which is Llic complcnrcutary slackncsti
coudition (3.'L) with y~ lz~ instcad of ~ showing that r is a best response to ~~- tz~
(and u a corresponding opt,imal dual solut.ion~. Similarly, i~ is a bcst~ responsc
1.0 :r } .tiz~. 0
In orrlc~r Lo Icavc Lhc~ sl.:u'I~in{; vcctor (.v,l), wc~ nccd sulul.iunti Lo (4.(i) a.nd
(4.'L) wherc -~~ C I is possihlc. Whcncvcr zu dcr~rcasr~s frorn I, Lhc condil.iou5 ('l.3)
Cor rcalization plans irnply Lhat usually scvrrn! cornponcnts of r (and sirnilarly y)
become simultancously nonicro in t.hc equations Isx - r(l -z~), tiince t.lrese arc Lhc
sanrc homogr~ncous ryu~rl.iuns ax Is's - c in (2.3), and only thc fint., nonlrotnogeneuus
crluation ~~N - I- zu iti rli(fcrcnl. 'I'hc inil.i~rl sulul.ion :r - 0, ?t - 0 docs nol, shuw
whin c ~ornpuncnl,s of :c ancl y~ should bc inc~rcasecL Onc uf L6csc roinponcnts is I hc~
(irst entcrinK variablc, I hc othcrs must bulong lu thr~ init.ial alrnost complcmcnlary
basis. Wc clr~t.cnnine I,his Ir.r.tiis by lincar pro};ramminl;, similarly Lo Karniya and
'1'alniau (I'f~)(t) a.nd Uai anrl 'I'alman (19S):i), ati follows.
Our iuiLialization stcp is nrotivated by Lcmma 1.2. Compul.c a bcst response
i to t and a bctit respuusc y Lo s. 'Chat is, :c is a solution to 1.hc LP: rnaxi[nire
xT (At~ subjcc.t. Lo Is:c - r~, a~ 0, and j Lo thc LP: maximizc (srEJ~~ subject, to
p'T~ - J, y ~ 0. 'I'Iri, yiclds also corresponding oplimal dual vectors u and v so
I:rthat. :rr(Fru- Al) - 0 and j~(h'rv - l3TS) - 0. We can assume that i and y are
basic salutions to these two LPs, for example as they are computed by the simplex
algorithm for linear programming. That is, an invertible submatrix of each matrix E
and F(which both have full row rank) detennines the respective basic components
i„ and y~ which may be positive, and deterrnines uniquely u and v, respectively.
'1'hen, the init,ial almost cornplementary basis for Lemke's algorithm contains zo, all
components of u and v, all but one of t.he variables x, and yo corresponding to the
basic LP variables ~o and yo above (the missing one is the first entering variable),
and thc slack variables (w~)~ and (wy)o in wr - LTU - At and wy - FTV - BTS
for the other sequences a. Latcr, we come back to some fine points concerning this
init.ialization step. We surnmarize what we have found so far.
Algorithm 4.3. Consider an extensive garne for two playcrs with perfect recall,
anrl ils scyurnrc firrnr with payoff rnatricc:v A and l3 and constraint matrices l; and
!~' fur player 1 and player 2, respectively. Choose a starting vector (s,t) fulfilling
(4.9). Construct, thc mixcd L(,`P with constraints (4.6) and (4.2). Solve this LCP
a.v follows.
(a.) hind an initial almost cornplemcntary ba.cic tiolution with ze - 1 where the
b.rsic varíables are zcr, all components of u aud rr, and all but one of the
roruponenls of x and y~ representing best response sequences against t and s,
respect ively.
(b) Iterate by complernentary pivotíng steps applied to pairs xo, (w~)o or yo, (wy)o
o( r.ornplcrnentary variablcs.
(r:) As soon as zo becornes zero, let zo leave the basis and pivot. Terminate. The
cornpulcrl equílibrium is (~, y).
Wc havc~ showu iu Lenrnra 4.1 that. iu thc coursc of t.hc computation, thc valucs
oC :r, y, and zcr detcrrninc always a pair of rcalization plans x f szo and ,y f tz~ and
thus a path in the product of the two strateg}' spaces. We are only interested in thís
path, since the basic variables in u and v are uniquely determined.
IL remains tu show that the algorithrn lerminatcs. With the above interpreta-
t.ion, we can exclude ray lerrninalion, which rnay cause Lernke's algorithm to fail,
because the path cannot leave the strategy space. Before, this was proved by Koller,
Mcgiddo, and von Stengel (199fi) using a rathcr tcchnical theorem, which also re-
yuires nonpositive payoff matrices A and l3. [lere, A and 13 can have positivc and
nega.l,ive cntrics since we consider a rnixeci L(:P (t.he variables in u and v are un-
rest.ricted and never leave thc basis). 'I'hus, the algorithm terminates if the path is
uniyne in thc sensc t,hat no basis is revisited. This reyuires systematic degeneracy
rrsolulian. We discuss this technical topic in the Appendix. There, we also simplify
the init.ialization st.ep (a), so that Algorithm rl.3 is just Lemke's original algorithm
(see Lernma A.'l).
1 fi5. Finding equilibria
Our cornplcnn~nLarY pivoting a.lgurithnr originxtes wilh Lho algorithrn by van (I~~ri
Elrcu and 'l'alrnan (19!11) for bimat.rix garnes. 'I'Itey I unsider a starting vcctor in
Lhe product of the two Inixed strategy sitnplices which are Lhc play(~rs' titrategy
spa('.cs. A hirnatrix ganil~ ('an bc rcprescntcd by thc scltucncc furnl if i1 and l3 ar(~
I,Itc payo(f rnatriccti and hot,h l; and 1~' arc.lust rows of once and r- f- I, so t,hat,
(2.~) says Lhat. ,r and ~~ ar(~ ntix(~(1 titrategi(~ti. With t.he cuveriug vector d in (4.~i),
onc can scc wil.h 1.hc óclti of Lcnlnta 4.1 thal. Lcrnkc's algoritlun above is in fact.
cyuivalent, to t,hc a.lqoril.hrn by van (Icn Glzcn aud Talrnau. 1'or a general seyucn(c
fornt, thc shalrc uf tllc ,I ra.l.cgY spaccs iti n(~w. Wc will illust.rat.c Lhis aspc('I, wil h
our exarrtplc.
"I'he startiug vector (.ti,t) is used 1.hroughouL th(~ computat,ion Cor refercncc,
ain('e iL detertnines thc system (4.(i). As m(~ntioned, t.he first atep is Lo find a pnir
(~,i1) of bcst responses lo (.ti,l.). Like van d(~n l;lzen and'Calman (1991), wc assunte
thaL thcsc besL responscs are uniquc, so Lhat cvery opt.irnal rnovc (in a sequence o
with positivc probabilit.y r„ or ,i~„ ) is thc only optimal one at, it.s inforrnation s(~t..
This astiumption (which ('an be r(~laxecl, see nppendix) is t,rue for a gcneric st.art.ing
vc('Lor. ~1'Vtua, i a.nd j r(,pres(,nt pure stratcgic5, which are vcrt.ic(~s oC the sl,ratcgY
spaccs oC playcr l aud 2. rc5pccl.ivcly.
Contiidcr thc linc scgmcut Lltat joius (s, t) to (:r,zl). 7'his is Lhc set. of tlairs
(~(1 - wu) f.y-u,?I(1 - zu) t lz~) fur 0 C z(t C I. An initial part of this linc scgmcnt.,
whcrc (s, J) (orrospond, Lo (s,y) by (h.7) ancl z~ assumcs valucs in sorn(~ inL(~rval
[zll, I], is 1,IIC (irsl, tlicc(~ of thc pat h('urnputo~l by t.hc al~oril.hrn. 'I'hc n} I variabl(~s
(initial Ita.vic varialrlcs an(I cntcrin~; variablc) whotic Solutiuns Lo (~.(i) dctcrntinc Lhi~
firsl, liuc segrnenl, includc z~, all variables x~ and ya (or tlre sequcnces a Lllat aso
best responties to l aud .5, respcct.ivcly, and the slack variables (rur)„ and (w,r)„ iu
ruT - F,T u- A(y ~- lzo) aud 'my - l~'Tv- 13r(T -~ s~~) for somc of t.hc nouoptinlal
sequenccs o. F3ccausc ihc bcst responsc sequcnces arc uniyuc, all tltcse slacks a,rc
posiltive for ~u - I and thcrcfore st.ay positivc if z~ is sliglttly amallcr than onc.
As a sicl(~ remark conccrning thc initialization stc~p 4.3(a), note thaL wc allow
sornc basic variablcs x„ or y, for nonoptirnal s(~yucnces a (which havc valuc zero an(I
du not mattcr) in ordcr to gl,t. th(~ n(~ccssary nurnbcr of basic. va.riables. 'I'Lis happ(~ns
if certain information til~t.s are irrelevant for the best msponses i and j. "I'eehnically
spcaking, the strategy ~paces may not be simple polyt.opes; as one consequence, we
cannoL use thc algorithnt by Dai and Talman (1993) for our problcrn.
We now illustrate Lhe progress of thc algorithm with our example ahovc. `Ne
choose the fullowiug st.a.rting ve('tor (s, t), ornitting as before the cornponents .tiy,
8a, and Ce:
(~SI., ~Sli.ti, ~ylf'f') - (~4,IU. ~,2Ui ~,'1U) aIl(Í (~a, tA, ~~~i ~d) - ( I,:íi 2,:Si I,:li 1,~4).
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higure 5.1. Strategy space of player 1 with bcst response sequences of player 2
and computation steps, indicated by arrows or (underlined) steps with
no change for player 1. The starting point s is (sI,SRS,sRT) -
(~j,10, ~,20i 7,20)- .
7'he st.art,ing points s and t are marked in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 by a dot in the interior
of cach strategy space. 'Phc: unique best response sequence of player 1 to t is RS,
and the unique best response sequences of player 2 to s are b and c, which defines
the vertices i and y, denoted by RS and 6, c in Figure 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
'1'hus, two variables of x~~s, yei y~ are basic and one of them is the first entering
variable. 'f'he other components of x and ,y are nonbasic. 'I'he algorithm makes the
following steps, indicated in the figures.
1. The first step is the line segment starting at (s,t) in direction (i,y), where
with (4.7) the two realization plans x-~sz~ and y}tz~ of the two players depend
jointly on zo. '1'hat is, the two arrows marked "1." are traversed sinnrltaneouslv
by reducing zo from 1 to zc~ - s~~s, where t.hc path hits the best response region
for the sequence L of player 1 iu Figure 5.2. In terms of the system (4.6), this







6, c b, d
Figure Fi.2. SirategY spac'c of player 2 with best responses of player I and cotnput.a-
tion stcps. 'I`hc starting point t is (ta, tb, 1~,., ld~ -(r~;~, ~~3, ~~a, ~~s~.
In Figure 5.2, Lhe end of the arrow "1." is the corner of a square, a smaller-sizc~d
replica of thc, st,rategy space containing Lhe st,arting point t at, t,he same rdaLive
posit.ion. In ol.her words, wc expancl a sc1, frorn G towards the cornors of Lhe st.ratogy
spac e of player 'L. 7'his sel, c ouLains all realizal.ion plans of playc~r 'l where each se~
yuc~nco o is tilaycd aL Ic~ast. wiLh t~robabilit.y I„~~~. AL Lhat c ornc,r, unly thr scctnc~nc c~n
b and c of playcr 'l havc poaitivc cornponcnts y~ ancl y~., whc~rcas y„ - J,1 - ll.
Sirnilarly, the end of the arrow "l." in Figure ri.l is 1.he corncr of a Lrianglc whic h
contains all re~alization plans of player 1 whcre each sequence a is played at. IeasL
wiLh probabiliLy sozo. "1'here, only :c~~s is posiLive, the other sequences are played
wiLh rninimum probabilit.y.
2. Since 1.he, slack (cn,.)~, haa becume rero, iL is rc,plac'ed by its complemenLary
variablc~ :c~, i.hat is nuw incrc~asc,d. '1'his is Lhc~ c~oniplcrnc~utary pivoting stc~p (b)
of Algorithrn 4.3 wherc (w„)~, leaves and z~, c~nters the basis. When .x~, is
increatied, I,hen z~r rannot, decrease furt.her, since~ t.his woulcl nrake RS nonop-
Lirna.l, ur inc rca.tic, sinc'c this wuuld niakc L nunoptimal ( sc,c~ I~igurc `i.'l), but.
both xic,ti and :rr, are basic and rnay have posiLivc valuc~s. So za stays as it is.
Furthermore, only yt and ,y~ are basic for player'l, so his position in the corner
of the syuare is unchangcd, rnarked with "l." (underlincd) in I~ignre Fi.'L. I~or
I!1playcr l, thc arrow "'l." iu l~igurc 5.l dcnotc, a rclat.ivc incrcase of .c~, until
the besL response set of the seyucnce a of player 2 is reached. Then, the basic
slack variable (wy)„ becomes zero and is exchanged with ya.
3. Currc~nt,ly, 1.hc variables xr, and :r.rr,ti. o( playcr I arc basic, so that (w,.)r, ancí
(Tr',.)rt.ti am nonbasic .uid zcro. I~i,r playc~r'l, th~~ curnpntc,d pal.h in hi};urr, fr.'l
is thcrcforc now a segntent of the coruntun boundary of the two best response
regions for I, and 1i'.S. Thereby, the rclative size of T~„ can only increase if zo is
incrra.ticrl, whicb shrinks the set, of realizat.ions plans where each seyuence a has
nrinirnwn probability tazcr. 'I'his generates a srnaller syuare in Figure 5.2, and,
by the same shrinking factor, a srnaller triangle in Figurc 5.1, until xRS becomes
zero, which happens when zo is increased to ~~~~. 'I'hat is, the end of the
arrow ".3." points to the tip of the small triangle where xr is the only positive
rornponent of :r. 'I'he leaving variable zr~,S ís replaced by it.s complement (wr)Rs
whicó cnters thc basis, so that thc best respouse region for RS in Figure 5.2
can be Icit.
4. Nothing changes for player 1 in }''igure 5.1 since ya,yb,,y~ are all basic, so zo
rcrnains const.ant. Lcaving the best response region for RS means that y, is
increased, until yb is zero. 'I'his variable is replaced by its complement (wy)y.
'}'he best response region for b in Figure 5.1 can be left.
5. The current basis contains only xL, ya, y~, so the best response sequences are L
for player 1 and a and c for player 2. 'I'hen, zo can be decreased again, ín fact
until z~ - 0, reaching the equilibrium (x3,y3) with á~ - 1 and ya - y~ - 1,
which is Lhe end of the computed path.
'hhiv exarnple is speci[ically designed to show I,hat an intermittent increase of zo is
possible, which is usually rare, at least for low-dimensional strategy spaces or for
binial.rix gaanes. '1'his behavior, and which eyuilibrium is found in case the game
her.ti inore than onc cyuilibrium, depend on the starting vect.or. The reader tnay
verify that. if the starting point t of player 'l is changed so that all moves a, b, c, d
havc cyual probability r~2i then the samc eyuilibrium is reached in three steps, first
moving in direction !, in higure 5.1 and direct,ion 6, c in I'igurc 5.2, until a becomes
a bc.til. respouse of playcr 2, then shifting from b to a while zo is fixed, and finallv
rcaching the cyuilibrirun. For yet anothcr starting vector where, in addition, s is
changceí so that all tnoves of player 1 have eqnal probability, that is, s~ - sr; -~~j
and .tirts -.tirc.r -~~~, t.hc sarnc equilibrium is rcached in a single step.
13y changing the st.arting vcctor it. is also possible to compute other equi-
libria. 1~'or examplc, when t,hc algorithm starts from (s,t~ with (s~, vRS,sRT) -
(~'~iu, '~zo,'~zu) and (t,,, tb, t~, t~) - (r~s, ~~s, t~~, ~~3), then it cornputes t.he equilibrium
(x~, ~j~) (see I~'igures 3.3 ancí ;1.4).
nll the cyuilibria rcachable in this manner have a negative indea (the iudex
of a.n cyuilibrium is the sigu of the dete~rminant. of a certain tnatrix related to that
`L(1cyuilibriurn; sce Shaplcy f974, van dcr Laan 19ti4). Ilowcvcr, it is also possiblc tu
find positivcly indexed equilibria. Crucial hcrc is Lhe~ obscrvation thal. thc set. ol'
realitation plans satisfying (9.6) anei (9.`L) is iu general larger Lhan Lhe pic~c ewitic,
linear path connecting t.he starting vect,or and the relatcd eyuilibriurn. 'I'his scL
includes all ot.hcr Nash cyuilibria. [n the (irsl, cxample above with start,ing vector
(s, l), there c~xists also a piecewise linear patb oF vectors connectiug the eyuilibria
(xr,y~) and (r:Z,?jl). All these strategy vectors obey t.he conditions demanded for
by the algorithm. We can therefore find thc positivcly indexed equilibrium (x', y' )
as follows. In thc first stage wc find the equilibrium (i~,y~) when starting frorn
(s, t). Then we~ considcr Lhe systern (4.6), (9.2) dcrivcd from the first starting vcctor
(s, l). '1'hc aquilibrium (:c~, y~i) is a solution to this syst,em which is not, on thc pal,h
atarting at (s, t). Starting with (x, y) -(:cz, ~1) and z~ - 0, wc start, the algorithnr
by letting zc~ ent,er the basis. 'fhen the algorithnr computes the equilibrium (ar,,yr)
by I,hc following sl.eps.
I'. l3asic variablcs arc (v,~)r,, ~tts, sttr, (cu~)~„ ?ln, ?l, ,?l~t. '1'ha c~ntcring varia.l,lc~
zo is increased to r~K, where (wz)L becomes rero and Ieaves the hasis.
2'. The cntcring variable ~ t, is iucreased Lo r~~~5c;c~, wherc (wy)a bccorrres zero and
Icaves. No changc occurs for zo and ,y.
:;'. The entcring variable ya is increased until ya - l~s whcre z~ - 0. 'Chcn v~
leaves Lhe basis. '1'he algorit.hrn terrninates with (.c,y) -(xc,,y~).
In principlc, Lhc cyuilibriurn (x~,yr) is cornputed at Lhc cnd af st.cp 2' whcrc~
x~ - x~- szc~ and ,y~ - r~ f lz~. Since Lhc path ends, van den I;Izen and ~'l'a.lrnan
(1991, 199~i) Icl. Lhc alguril.hrn tcrminatc harc. Wc run Lhc mcthod aa a apec ial
case o[ Le[nke's algorithrn aud include the (inal step :f'. Uriving z~~ t.o zero is alsu
appropriate for the eyuivaleuce with Harsanyi and Selten's tracing procedure, whcre
zn is the probability of playing against Lhc prior (s, t). '[his is thc topic of the ncxL
section.
6. Game-theoretic interpretation
'fhe cornputation of the algorithrn can be interprcted garne-theoret.ically. We~ will
shuw that it mirnicks the lracing procedurc by Ilarsanyi and Sclten (1988), applicd
tu Ihc norrna,l form of t.hc gamc. [~'urthcrmorc, if thc starting vcct,or is cornplctcly
tnixcd, Lhen I,hc compnl.ccl equilibrium will be norrna! Jorrn pcrfrct. For grcater
dcl.ail wc refcr to van den ~;Izen and 'I'ahnan (1995) who showed these propertics for
bitnatrix garncs.
The tracing procedure starts from a common prior. P'or two-person garnes, this
is a pair of st.rategies describing the preconceptions of the playcrs about the other
playcr's bchavior. initially, thc playcrs rcact optimally to thcse expectations. ln
gcneral thcy obscrvc thal, Lhcir expectations arc not fulfilled and 1,hus adjusL thcir
'l Ic~xpc~ctations abouL Lhc bchavior of the othcr player. íícsides, morc and more infor-
mat.ion about Lhc game is revealed. 13y simultaneously and gradually adjusting the
expect,ations and reacting opLimally againat these revised expectations, eventually
an cquilibrium is reached.
Consider (irst a bimatrix game 1' wit.h payofF inatrices A and B, as a special
ca-tic~ of a ganre in scqucnce forrn. The tracing procedure generates a path of strategy
pairs (á,y). I~ach such pair is an equilibriurn in a parameterized garne I'(zo). The
priur is Lhc sarnc ati our starting vc~ct.or (.ti,l). 'I'hc payoffs in I'(zo) are as if cach
playcr plays wil,h probabilil,y zc~ against Lhc~ Irriur a.nd wiLh probability I-z~ agaiust
the actual straLegy iu (i, y) of the othcr player. '1'haL is, player 1 receives in I'(zo)
expected payoff z~ - iT(At) f (1 - zo) .~T(Ay), and player `l receives payoff zo .
(.ST l~)y f ( 1 - zo) ~ (iT B)y.
"I~he tracing procedure st.arts with zcr - 1, where x aud y are the players'
opt.iinal responsus Lo Lhe prioc 'I'hen zo is decrcased, changing (i,y) such t.hat.
it stays an equilibriurn of 1'(zo). Sometimes, changing the value of zo may stall
(,inrilar to t,he cornputation sLeps 2. and 4. in the example in Section 5), tracing
t.hc~n insLcad a continuum of equilibria in ['(zo) which is usually one-dimensional
(t,hc~ non-standard case is discussed in Schanuel, Simon, and Zame 1991). These
conditiuns define 1.he so-called 6~raear Gracing procedure. They generate a unique path
excepL for degenera.cies, which do not occur for generic bimatrix games and a generic
st.art.ing vector. Degeneracies are resolved by the logarithmic tracing procedure (see
[íarsanyi and Selten 1988), which we do not regard here. The procedure ends with
zu - 0 where P(0) - I'.
Uenerically, the linear tracing procedure suffices and coincides with the log-
ariLhmic tracing procedure. Then, it corresponds to the computation by Algo-
rit.htn 9.3. lu I'(zcr), playcr l receives payoffs that are the same a.c the original
payofTs in 1' against. t,he randomizcd strategy zo - t f(I - z~) . y. This holds be-
causc wo arc dcaling with only two playcrs. Similarly, player 'l receives the original
payoffs againsL Lhe strategy zu . s f (1 - zo) .~. By (4.7), Lhis is the strategy pair
(.r ~.vzu,,y f lzc) where Lhe pair (s, y) is computed by the algorithm and corresponds
to (:r, y). Lcnrma 4.'L asserts that (i, y) is an equilibrium of I'(zo).
'I'hus, the paths generated by Lhe tracing procedure and by the algorithm
coinc ide up Lo projection. Whereas the tracing procedure traces a pair of strategies
in tlre full strategy space and considers conve~x combinations of payoffs with weights
zc~ and 1 - z~, Lhe complementary pivoting algorithm generates the corresponding
convex combinations of straleq:es which belong to a restricted strategy set that
expauds and shrinks proportionally to l- z~. In other words, the tracing procedure
gene~rates a path of Nash equilibria (or games with perturbed payoffs, whereas Lhe
algorithm dclivcrs a path o( Nash equilibria related t,o restricted strategy dornains.
Both rnethods tcrminate in the sarne equilibrium.
'l`2"l'hc prec eding statemcnl.s apply dircctly tu biniatrix garnes, as shown by van
den I~:Izen and 'I'alrnan ( 199Fi). liy Lho sarnc argument.s, 1.hc comput.aLiun crnulatcs
a suil.ably delined tracing procedurc for the seyuence furrn. Moreover, we can show
Lhat the piecewise liuear paLh cornputed by the algorithm applies also to the nornaal
Jor~on of the gamc, wherc thc stratcgy space of cac h playcr is the sirnplex of his rnixcd
straLcgics. So far, Lhe cuurputcd pal,h lics iii Lhc saqucncc form sl,rat.cfiY spacc. In
Section 2 wc havc shown that Lhis st.raLegy spacc is t.he image of the sinrplex of mixecl
stratcgies under thc lincar map dcliued by (2.'l). A suiLable prc-irnage under t.his
rnap of the cornputed paLh in f,he seyuencc forrn sLrat.egy space yields a piecewise
linear path in rnixed strategies, as follows.
Consider Lhe endpoinls of each lirre segmenL of Lhe compuLed path (defined by
t,wo successively computed almost complernentary bases, see Sectiou 4). Denote Lhe
cndpoints of such a linc segmcnt by (ï, y) and (:r, y), say. Let S he thc line segmcnt.
connect,ing ~ and ï in the strategy space of player 1(Lhe consideraLion for player 'l
is sirnilar). (;onsidcr rnixcd st.ratcgics p and ~ of playcr 1 LhaL havc rcalizat.ion plans
i and :"r, respccl.ivcly. In I,ha nrixcd st,ratcgy sirnplcx of playcr I, Llrc liuc segmm~L
connccting jr. and jl is rnappcd cmdcr (2.`l) Lo S sincc LhaL rnap is liucar. Thus, S'
can indeed bc, translated to a line segment in nrixed strategies.
'I'he parl.icular prc imagc of ,S in thc rnixccl straLcfiY simplcx ducs noL rnattcr,
hecause mixcd sLraLegics wiLh 1,hc samc rcalizal.ion plans arc rcalizaLiou equivalcnL
and thereforc payoff equivalcnL, so thc equilihriurn properLy in I'(zcr) is prescrved. A
canonical choicc for jr and ja arc Lhc behavior stratcgies of playcr I with rcalizat.ion
plans ~ and :i, respectivcly. NoLe, however, Lhat thc cntire line segrncnt S should
not. bc LranslaLed Lo bchavior strategies, sincc this docs noL yield a line iu thc mixcd
strategy sirnplex if the convcx conrhinations uf ji and Y. are not hchavior stratcgics.
We havr shown Lhat we cau consider the cornpul,ed paLh as a trace in rnixecl
strat.egics. hullowing van dcn I;Izcn and 'I'alman (199~), wc can also show Lhat.
the cornpuLed eyuilibrium is nurmal form perfect if the prior (.v,t) is corrrplrlely
mired. A completcly mixed realiration plan assigns positive realizaLion probabilit.y to
evory seyucncc. 'Che corresponding behavior strategy plays cvery rnovc with posit.ivc
probabiliLy, and considcred as a mixed strategy, it chooses every pure strategy wit.h
ponitivc prohabiliLy.
Lemma 6.1. !f the sl.arting vcctor (s, t) is cornpletcly nrixed, thcn Algorithrn 4.:3
computes an eyuilibriurn that is norrnal forrn perfect.
Proof. Let the starting vector (.ti,G) be cornpletely rnixed ancl let (u',y') be t.he
conrputed equilibriurn. Txcept for iLs endpoint (x', y"), the IrLtit line segment of
thc computcd path consists of pairs (x f szn, y~- l~n) of rcaliration plans whcrc
zo 7 0, due to condition 4.3(c:). 'I'herefore, Lhese realization plans are, like s and t,
rornpletely mixecí. '1'hc cquilibriucn (x',y') is thc limil of thcsc rcalization plans
'L'3whcn z~ gocs to zcro, and is a pair of bcst responscs to these realization plans bccause
uf t.he complernentarity coudition (4.`2), since x` and ,y' havc~ the same basic (that
is, positive) cornponents as x and y(a sitnilar argument was made in the proof
of Lcrnma 4.`l). '1'hcse propcrtics hold also when the computed path is translated
to niixed strategies as described above. According to Selten (1975, Thm. 7), they
intply that thc cyuilibrium (x', y') is pcrfect in thc normal form. Q
hor bintatrix games, each point on the computed path translates to an equilib-
rium of the reslricledgame whcre each sl.rategy is played aL least with the probability
il, has undcr (s,l) . zcr. '1'liis can also scrvc to provc Lhat Lhc equilibrium is pcrfect.
llsing the seyucnce form, it. is bet.ter to invoke Selten's condition as in the preced-
ing proof siuce I,hc probabilitics for playing pure strategies may vary for realization
equivalent mixed strategies and are thcrefore not well defined.
~l~ ~0~ ~0~ ~1~
h'igure fi.l. I;xtensive game where the eyuilibrium ( R, r) is normal form perfect but
not extensive forrn perfect.
'fhc traciug procedure, and the concept of a perfect equilibrium, are different
whcn they arc defïned for the extensive form instead of the normal form of the game.
'1'hc extensivc game in Figure 6.1, taken from van Damme ( 1987, p. 114), has an equi-
libriurn ( R, r) in pure strategies in the reduced normal form. ]n the full normal form.
Lhe c~quilibriurn would be written (R.S, r). '1'his ec{uilibrium is not extensive form
perfect since it is uot even subgame perfect. 'I'he only subgame perfect eyuilibrium
is (l,.4, O. Ilowever, the equilibrium ( H, r) is normal form perfect. It is computed by
Algurithm 4.:1 when started frorn the prior (s, t) whe~re ( s~s, titT, SR) - (r~a, t~s, r~a)
and (lr,l,) -(~~~„~~5), say. '['he dotninated sequcnce (and strategy) I,T has proba-
bilil,y zero in the equilibrium (R,r). However, the sequence LS has also probability
zero. and in approaching the equilibrium, the probabilities for the moves S and T
Z-1are as prescribed in the starting vector, which implies a non-vanisbing probability
[or the dorninated rnove 'I'. Only at the equilibriurn these move probabilities become
uudefincd.
"Unreasonable,~' behavior at unreached informat,ion sets cannot be excluded
with normal forrn approaches. Computing with the seyuence form is such an ap-
proach. Howcver, it is trivial to solve subgames first. In h'igure 6.1, this removes the
equilibriurn (Il,r) that is noL subgame perfect. Turtherrnore, norrnal form perfect
equilibria are at least wcrlkl,y sr.yverrtinll~ ralinnnl in the extensive forrn game (Reny
l99`l). Finally, one can Lry several (for example, randomly chosen) priors, to test,
the sensitivity of the computed eyuilibrium with respect to the starting point. We
suggest this as a topic for future research.
Appendix: Degeneracy resolution
In an extensive galue, certain equilibria nray avoid entire branches of Lhe Lree. 'I'hen, Lhc
behavior of one player in these unreached branches is to sorue extent arbitrary, like the
probability yd for the sequence d in the set of equilibria (x3,y3) above. In particular,
one of these eyuilibria has yld - 0 even though d is optimal, that is, (wy)d - 0. "1'his is
a rlryenerucy, narnely, a hasis COIIL'alrling a basie variable (eithcr y,r or (wy),r) which has
value zero. (I, arises due to Lhc structure of the game Lrec, cven for generic payotfs, and
applies not only to the sequcncc forrn but also to the rnore redundant normal form of t.he
game.
I)egeneracy musL be~ doalt wít.h propr~rly, parl.ly for Lhe following Lechnica.l roasun.
'1'he cornplementary pivoting algorithm terminates if no almost complementary basis is
revisited. '['his is Lhe case if the Icaving variablc is always uniquc. If there are Lwo
variables Lhat rnay Icave Lhc basis, onc of thcrn will stay basic and havc valuc zero aft.cr
the pivoting step, so the resulting btLSis is degenerate. '1'hus, if degeneracy can somehow
be avoided, the algorithm will terminate in a(inite number of steps.
This is achieved by the well-known lexicrxlrnphic methnd, actapted by Koller, Megiddo,
aud von Stongel ( 1996) for our Lype of algorithm. Consider the systcrn
Iro-Mz-rizrl-q
which is eyuivaleult to rn - y} Mz f dzu iu ( 1.:5), where I is Lhc n. x n. identil,y ma.trix.
A basis e.orresponds to an invertihle n x ra submatrix C of [l,-M,-d], so Lhat Ihc
vector of basic variables is C-Iq. An in(initesirna.l perturbance of y, replacing y b.y q(s) -
y~-(E,E2, ..,f")T for somc positivc but vanishingly small E, then defines a vector C-I q(e)
of basic variables. 'Chese are all positive (although some of them may be vanishingly
srnall) iff the matrix [C-Iy,C-r] is lexicographically positive, that is, the first nonzero
entry of each row is posit,ive. 'I'he basis is then called lr.xico-positivr.. `I'he invariant that
all cornputed bases are lexico-positive is preserved by pivoting with the "lexico-minimum
ral.io test", which determines the leaving variahle uniqucly. 'Ihe actual values of the basic





Figure A.1. Partial view of the strategy spaces after artificial perturbance of the LCP data
to ae.hicve nondegencracy. The labels show that only one equilibrium (x9, y')
marked with 0 remains from the corresponding infinite set of equilibria in
Fignres 3.3 and 3.4.
Ayplied to our example, this (simulated) perturbation of the LCP data, if it actually
took place with e~ 0, would remove the degeneracies in Figure 3.3 and reduce the infinite
set of eyuilibria (z3, y3) marked by boxes in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 to a singleton. Namely, the
line in Figure 3.3 separating the best response regions for c and d would no longer hit the
vertex xf, - 1 but one of the sides of the triangle. Figure 6.1 shows one possible effect of
this perturbation, where the set ofequilibria becomes the single equilibrium (x4, y4) in pure
strategics with x~, - 1 and (y,~„ ye, y~, yd) -(1, 0,1, 0), as can be sec n from the labels ofthe
regions. Thc other possibility is shown in Figurc 6.2, where the eqnilibrium is (xs, ys) with
x~, being nearl,y onc and x~ts nearly zero, and (ya, yb, y~, y~) -(1, 0, r~r2, rr~12). Above,
we have considered the case e- 0, where x3 - x4 - xs and any convex combination y3
of y~ and y5 is an eyuilibrium strategy of player 2.
1'or thc particular order of LCP variables xL, xRS, xnT, yo, yb, y~, yd that we chose
in this example, the lexicographic rule corresponds to the situation in Figure A.2 (where
xs is indistinguishable from the vertex xL - 1). In the final computation step shown in
1'igrue 5.1, the path reaches the degenerate vertex xr, - 1 and the algorithm terminates
since z~ - 0, according to 4.:3(c). Applied to the perturbed problem in Figure A.2, it in
fact hit.s first the best response region for sequence d(labeled 07 in Figure A.2), so that
another pivoting step happens: (~oy)d leaves and yd enters the basis, which is increased
whil~~ z~~ - 0, until Ihe best. response region for IZS is reached (for y,r - rr~r2), whereupon
r~t,y i~utors Lhe basis, but stays at value zero, and zu finally leaves. 'l'hat is, the algorithm,
usinK t.hc lexirographic rule alone, íïnds the above equilibrium (xs, ys) rather than the
pure strategy equilibrium (x4, y~). 1'he final degenerate pivoting step is interesting for the
following reason. Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996) have shown that the algorithm,
using the lexicographic rule until zo leaves the basis, terminates in an equilibrium. It
may happen that the variable zu could leave the basis earlier because it is zero, but that
zu is not chosen by t.he tie-breaking lexicographic rule. So far, it was open whether the
ïfiy~ - 1 O y5
- I .'l,~ - 1
~ 0 ~
L R.5'
Figure A.2. Similar to Figure A.1, a differenL perturbance leaves the other extremc equi-
librium (xs, y'S) in the formerly infmitc set of r~quilibria.
(xtru test if zu can leave the basis can shorten Lhe cotnpuLaLion. The example shows thaL
such a shortcut is indeed possibla On the oLher hand, one may expliciLly noL takc this
shortcut and note that there is an eyuilibrium, buL keep on computing Lo find perhaps an
additional equilibrium, here (r5, y5). In Algorithm h.3, condition (c) prevents Lhis.
'1'he initial almost complemenLary basis sholdd also be lexico-positive. 'Phis basis,
for zo - 1, is highly degenerate since it has many basic variables with value zero, namely
the components of x and y which are basic variables. Which variables should be basic,
and which should be Lhe (irst entcring variable'? ]n order to solve Lhis prohlern, Lernke's
algorithm for Lhe standard (not the mixed) LCFcan be used from the very beginning, as
described in the remainder of this section. This avoids altogether the initialization (a) in
Algorithm h.3 by linear programrning. We modify our problem as follows.
Assumption A.1. Every leaf has negative payolfs. 'fhe starting vector (s,t) is corn-
pletely mixed, that is, it assigns positive ptobability to r.very sequencc a.
Negative payofTs can be achieved by subtracting a suitable constant, which does noL
alLcr the gam(~. Then, the sparse payoff matrices fulfill n G 0 and U G 0. '1'his irnplios
thal, vr and rI a,re never p~ISiLive in any opLim:rl solul,ions to Lhe dual I,I's wiLh constrainl.s
(:9.1 ) and (3.3), respecLivr,ly, due to the structure uf l; and l.'. '[hus, we can replace u by
-n aud require that Lhin now vector u is nonnega,l.ivc. 'I'hen the problem of maxirnizing
the expected payoff xT(ily) has tho dual LP: IIIIIIItnI'!.e -fT7l subjecL Lo -F;TU 1 i1J,
u~ 0. '[hc primal LP, iu turn, is Lo Ina.xirnize :c~(Ay) subject to F,x 1 c, x ~ 0.-'l'hat
is, instcad oí converting h,'x - c Lo the pair of ineyualities L;x ~ e and Ex G e, we only
uso the first of these ineyuxlities. '1'he same is done for the second player. -
'l'his yiclds an L(~Y in atandard inequality form wiLhout incrcasing its dimension.
'I'he new LCN data are
`l7-c 1'
-1




'[ho LCY variables z-(u, v, x, y)r and w-(w,,, v~,,, w,, wv)T are a11 nonnegative.
Since A G 0 and I) G 0, the covering vector d given by (4.5) is nonnegative and has
posit.ive components d; whenever q; G 0. We can therefore use the original initialization
of Lomkc's algorithm: l.ct w be the first vector of basic variables. Uetcrrnine the smallest
zcr sach that q f dzu ~ 0. 'I'his is zu - 1, where a,ll components of w„ and w„ become
zero. With z~r as entering variable, a component of w is chosen to leave the basis. Using
the lexicographic rule, all bases am lexico-positive from then on. 'fhe components of w„
and w,,, and certain components of wr and wy, are then successively replaced as basic
variables by cornponents of u and v and z and y, respectively. These initial pivots are all
degencrate, changing the basis but not the values of the basic variables, until zo C 1. 'F'he
cornputation proceeds as before if we can guarantee that the slacks in w„ and w„ never
bocornc positive.
Lemma A.2. llnrlerAs:,urnption A.1, consirler the L('P (9.1) with q, M as in (AJ) and
cnvrring vorlor d as in (4.i). 1'hen Lernke's algorithrn, using the lexicographic rule aud
letting zu lexve the basis as soon as zu hecornes zero, solves (4.1) and finds an equilibrium
(x, y). No component of w„ or w„ assumes a positive value during the computation.
Prarf. 13y '1'hcorem 4.9 of Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996), the algorithm ter-
minat.es, sina,, arnong other things, the matrix M is c.oposilive, that is, z~ 0 implies
zrMz ~ 0, which holds bacansc zrMz - xr(-A- Il)y. -
Consider an almost complementary basis cornputed during the algorithm. We are
interosted in Lhe values of zo, x, y, w,,, w,,. Assume that, contrary to our claim, there is a
proper inequality in w„ - l;'s - e(1 - zo) 7 0 with a positive component of w,,. By (2.3),
this mcans eithcr :r(0) 7 I- zu or -
~ x(onc) ~ x(~e) (A.2)
cECn
for sorne infornration set h. So for some choice c at h, the component z(ohc) of x is
posit.ive and could be reduced by the value of the slack variable. If the sequence ohc does
not Icad to a leaf, it leads to an information set h' further down in the tree and appears
a.5 right hand side x(oh~) in (A.2). I3y induction, we finally obtain a sequence o leading
to a leaf where x„ can be reduced by a positive amount. If x(0) ~ I- zcr, this can also be
o-N.
lly the complernentarity condition, the current r maximizes the linear expression
~T A(71 t tzv) (with y and zu fixed) subject to
Ex ? e(1 - zo), x~ 0. (A.3)
Ilowever, thc vector A(yttzu) is nonpositive. Wc have shown that (or a seyuence o leadiug
to a leaf, ao can be reduced while preserving (A.3). I3ut this yields a contradiction since
'LRthe corresponding component (A(y } lzu))o is uegative. Indeed, we tnay assumc zu ~ 0
sincc this is Lrne for the premding almost complernentary basis (otherwise thc algorilhnr
wonld have tcrrninated) aud thus un thc lasl. lim~ segmeut on thc computed path (possibly
oxrluding il.s oudpuint.). I'nrlhormurc, I is cumpli~l~~ly nrixod, so Lhc loaf in rcac'hrd wil.h
poail.ive probabilil.y. II, sullices Lhal. q is nunucgativo. NoLc that ,y { lzrr is nuL necrssarily
a roalizatiun pla.u sincc !'(y } lzu) ~ f may a priuri not hold witó equality. 'I'hus, an„
sL:~ys zero LhnrnghnuL th~, a.lguril.lrm, a.ntl w do~:ti vq,. ~J
Note that in Lemma A.'l, some components of w„ and w„ may stay basic variables,
bul, t.hey wíll noL assume positive values. Of eourse, once they are replaced by Iheir
complementary coruponenta uf u or v, respectively, one ran as in 4.3(b) make sure that.
Lhey never enter the basis again. 'I'he components of v,, in particular of vi„ and fo,,,
correspond to Lhe culumns uf I in Lbe matrix [l,-d,-M] above. '1'hese are useful to kecp
for Lhe Iexicographie rule wheu pivol.ing is perfornmd usiug Lhe lublernr C-r[q,l,-d,-M]
wit.h thc ba.';is matrix C.
With a detailed analysis of Lhe tableau during the initial pivoting operations (which
is too long to bc presented here), Lerntna A2 can be shown undcr slightly weaker as-
aumptions. In particular, s and l do not have to be cornpletely mixed. llowever, this
assurnption is also conceptually useful for cornputing normal form perfect equilibria, as
shown in Section 6.
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